THUG POLITIK -- The Neo Con Agenda for a New American Century, Part III

The image of the State in 1984 is that of a boot in the face

Brian to Winston, in Orwell's 1984

In human affairs, nothing arises in a vacuum but rather develops from a pre-existing kernel. Neocon doctrine is no different and is what might be called an “historical inference.”

Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, the phrase “zones of democratic peace” had a pre-existing usage, the ultimate effect of which was simply that it was considered beneficial to the United States to extend the capitalist free-trade system to as many countries and regions in the world. In Ancient Athens, the same hegemonic doctrine might well have been labelled, “Zones of Hellenic Co Prosperity” What is new is the meaning the Neocons have given to “hegemony.”

Even here, the brutalization of american hegemony is not without antecedents. Through the Korean War, it can be said, in a general way, that the United States pursued its hegemonic interests by fairly conventional means. That changed with Vietnam, where turning South Vietnam into a U.S.-friendly zone of democratic peace, entailed participation in a civil war and, hence inescapably, participation in a war against civilians. The most notorious aspect of this war was the U.S. “pacification” program, which involved turning villages into mini-concentration camps and murder, code named Phoenix. Even here, the actions were not without antecedents in the German administered Generalgouvernment and Nazi occupation policies in “the eastern” territories.

But to say that the neocon Thug Staat is not without antecedents is not to say that it is simply more of the same. It is not. It is a progression by degree beyond a threshold that has resulted in something qualitatively and dangerously new. In the New American Century, the exercise and enjoyment of the means has become an end in itself.

As Brian explained to Winston in the torture chambers of the Ministry of Truth, prior to 1984, governments and tyrants always sought to justify their power in terms of some ulterior good. Whatever that good was asserted to be, power was exercised in the name of bringing that good about. Likewise the exercise of power was limited by what was justifiable in terms of the asserted good. No more. The Party in 1984 had learned that power could and would be exercised entirely for its own sake no more, without need to justify it by anything other than the self justification of the pursuit of dominance.

It was thus useless for Winston to scream “why?” -- the answer was simply “because”. It was useless for Winston to argue that what the State was doing was self-defeating, because what the State was engaged in was was self-asserting for its own sake. Power projection for its own sake was the beginning and end of existence.

To say that the goal of US policy is to project power, and preserve preeminence through “full spectrum dominance” is simply to say that there is no ulterior goal -- that power is a good in and of itself. But power in and of itself is simply the smashing if things; and smashing things...smashing countries, people... is what the neocon agenda is all about.

This is not to say, that no ulterior justification is ever used in the PNAC Manifesto. From time to time there is some tepid allusion to “American interests and princoples” whatever those “principles” might be. These are simply linguistic holdovers on the march toward a simpler, purero NeoSpeak. What is astonishing how little ulterior good is ever mentioned.

The Manifesto never talks about erecting schools, economic development, culture, infrascturcture, Peace Corps in zones of democratic freedom. In fact the Manifesto hardly ever speaks of American interests, other than the interest inhaving more control, more power, more hardware more destructive weapons.

To say that there is an ulterior purpose of “safety” is simply to use labels to play havoc with cause and effect. At some level of generality “purpose” becomes de facto meaningless. Safety through Dominance is no more than I’m safe because I’m bashing you. Peace through Rubbleizing.

Once it is understood that the Neocons are engaged in a purely Orwellian pursuit of power and dominance for its own sake, it can also be understood that their brutality will not be confined to “America’s security perimeter” On the contrary, it will of necessity be extended inward to The Homeland itself.

This follows first from the fact that once power projection is the self-justifying goal it really doesn’t matter where it is exercised. The point is to project and for this Kansas is as good as Khandahar. It follows also from the fact that once the American populace become inured to brutality, they will be indifferent to it when it pummels some “terrorist” in the Homeland; and it will in fact be considered a good thing that a potential terrorist was caught and rooted out.

It also follows fom the entire “security-based” mentality. “Security” begins at home and since the Homeland is the preeminent zone of democratic peace, it requires its security environment to be shaped as much as any other. Already the neoscum administration is seeking to dispense with constitutional limits on data mining all currently available information on U.S. citizens. It is already seeking to “organically” penetrate certain “suspect” and “target” groups, without ever specifying exactly what makes them suspect. It is already seeking to build security perimeters and walls all around the country, always pointing to the alleged inchoate threat outside and always ignoring that walls and controls and checks work both ways. The notion that the the State should “control” the internet and wage net-war on it, basically extends power projection and security shaping into the realm of information and thought.

Last but not least, it follows from the project to turn U.S. soldiers into drugged up killers. If the neocons are willing to turn U.S. soldiers into drugged up killers, they will see no objection to pharmaceutically enhancing domestic security forces. The images we see in Guantánamo, Afghanistan and Iraq today are a foretaste of the Homeland tomorrow. It will be so.

©WCG, 2003
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THUG POLITIK -- The Neo Con Agenda for a New American Century, Part II

II.

Constabulism: Degrade, Brutalize, Terrorize.

If unilateral and preemptive power projection is fundamentally irreconcilable with the stuff of civilization, what can one expect in its wake? Only anti civilization. “Zones of democratic peace” is simply Neospeak for national concentration camps in which civil society has been brutalized, terrorized and degraded to a sub-social level.

Not only does this follow implicitly from the policy premise of power projection, the neoscum actually brag about it and lay the program in fairly specific terms under the newly minted rubric of Constabulary Missions.

If there were nothing more to the neocon weltanschauung than kicking butt it could perhaps be said that it propounded nothing that different from Hobbesian realism or Calliclean cynicsm -- although even in those case the exercise of power was presupposed to subserve some ulterior good. But even that slim saving grace is removed by the neocon doctrine of constabulary operations. Under this quaint and archaic term -- reminiscent of the avunvular, moustachioed Bobby in his tall hat -- the neocon collapse ends into means and means into routinized bullying and oppression. Constabulism is the essential sarcoma of the Neocon vision for Hell on Earth.

Waging Peace & Maintaining War

After setting forth constabulary operations as one of the four critical missions for the U.S. military, the neocon Manifesto goes on to describe this mission with a string of catch phrases and slogans asserting that the new mission requires the U.S. military to,

• be equipped for “long term constabulary operations”, which
• “secure and amplify zones of democratic peace”; and
• “shape the security environemnt and the early stages of any conflict.”

These constabulary missions are something apart from traditional full-scale theatre wars. Accordingly, the Manifesto declaims that it is necessary to ensure

“that [the army] is equal to the tasks before it: shaping the peacetime environment and winning multiple, simultaneous theater wars”

With respect shaping the peacetime environment,

“the first order of business ... is to establish security, stability and order[,]

and to do so,

“American troops, in particular, must be regarded as part of an overwhelmingly powerful force.”

However, establishing order is only one prong of the constabulary’s two prong mission of “securing and extending” zones of democratic peace. The execution of these constabulary missions requires military forces which are,

"configured for combat but [i.e. “and”] capable of long-term, independent constabulary operations.”

Combat against whom? Whenever a military amplifies a zone, it necessarily invades, incurs into and wages war against an adjacent zone, whatever it may called, although “terrorist zone” seems to be the current label. Thus this constabulary task requires one and the same forces to engage in peacekeeping and war-making at the same time in the same general region.

What the PNAC envisions is “an American led security order” consisting of ongoing zonal wars along what it calls the “American security frontier.” This frontier is not our border with Canada or Mexico, but Eastern Europe and the Middle East

“[T]he new opportunity for greater European stability offered by further NATO expansion will make demands on ground and land based air forces [a]s the American security perimeter in Europe is removed [sic] eastward...”

and

“The Pentagon must retain forces to preserve the current peace in ways that fall short of conduction major theater campaigns. such [constabulary] forces must be expanded to meet the needs of the new, long-term NATO mission in the Balkans, and other missions in Southwest Asia, [i.e. “the Middle East and surrounding energy producing region”]

Madcap as this policy is, it is only half the lunacy, because the PNAC explicitly rejects traditional notions of "peacekeeping" which is why they coined the word “constabulary.” As the Manifesto itself states,

“Constabulary missions are far more complex and likely to generate violence than traditional ‘peacekeeping’ missions.”

Here, for anyone with eyes to read, the Manifesto tips its hand. What kind of constable generates violence? What is so “more complex” to normal “peace patrols”? To answer these questions, one must take a step back and examine historically accepted norms of international conflict.

Traditional peacekeeping operations fell into two broad categories. : (1) restoring civil order and services following conquest and occupation; or (2) acting as a buffer between belligerents. The German occupation of France and the subsequent Allied occupation of Germany are examples of the first variant, and the rules of this kind of peacekeeping are well established in international law. Generally speaking, the occupying army guards key installations in a low key fashion while it works with and relies upon pre-existing police departments and bureaucratic institutions to provide security and services as near to normal as possible. While the full convention of civil rights are not fully restored, the aim of a successful peacekeeping occupation is to be as unobtrusive and invisible as possible while yet maintaining control over the conquered State.

Buffer peacekeeping is the inverse. The goal is to remain as visible as possible to but to retain as little control (or responsibility) for the work of governing the territory in question. This is left to the contending parties in their respective spheres and is supervised only to the degree necessary to prevent further hostilities. In practice, this type of peacekeeping has proved problematic, but overall it has achieved some notable successes.

In light of these concepts, the dual task of securing and amplifying would ordinarily be interpreted as requiring both non-combat and combat missions; even if, as a practical necessity, these two distinct missions would usually be accomplished by one and the same military force. To be sure, this heteronomous dual-task is fraught with mission-confusion and screw ups which is why many traditionalist officers rankled at being required to do a job they saw as fundamentally non-military. Nevertheless, it is not such a dual task as has not been done before. Peacekeeping in conquered territory while “advancing the front” is nothing armed forces haven't done before.

However, this dual-tasking presented a problem for the PNAC authors because, in traditional terms, it required the military to discharge the fundamentally distinct missions of peace-keeping and war-making. Traditional peacekeeping was of no interest to the PNAC, which is the PNAC Manifesto explicitly rejected the concept of a post-combat peacekeeping mission, rather,

“these [constabulary] missions demand forces basically configured for combat.”

because the purpose of these missions is to

"remove [“hostile”] regimes from power and conduct post-combat stability operations. In purposes [sic], constabulary missions could be considered “lesser included cases”.

Lesser included of what? “Lesser included cases” was a term borrowed from law, where a simple assault with fists is said to be a “lesser included offence” of aggravated assault with a gun. Thus what the Manifesto explicitly states is that these peacekeeping (“constabulary”) missions are a lesser form of war.

Thus, constabulary forces

“will need sufficient personnel strength to be able to conduct sustained traditional infantry missions”

and

“They will need sufficient personnel strength to be able to conduct sustained traditional infantry missions, but with the mobility to operate over extended areas. They must have enough direct firepower to dominate their immediate tactical situation,”

The PNAC wanted a military that would “shape” the peacetime environment. Of course, the mission has nothing to do with “shaping peace” as a viable reality in itself. The word “peace” was thrown in here and there to lubricate the swallow. What is really at issue is “shaping the security environment” by which is meant shaping the conditions of those areas in which traditional military fighting is not taking place.

That is why “shaping the security” and “shaping the initial stages of conflict” could lie seamlessly along the the same spectrum. They weren’t distinct missions but different levels of the same mission.

That is also why “constabulary” non-peacekeeping was likely to generate violence. The phrase is uttered like a commonplace that ought to be accepted. Would anyone have thought otherwise? Actually, yes.

Customarily, it is not expected that traditional peacekeeping forces will generate violence. In fact it has not even been expected that they were likely to “meet with” more than occasional and isolated violence. The reason is simple. Victor and vanquished alike have an interest in resuming normal life once the battle is over. This does not mean that love and friendship reign; in fact, more than likely, hate and resentment will fester. But anyone who has experienced it hates war even more. War represents a disruption of normal life and hence a threat to life itself. People cannot live in a state of ongoing disruption and thus have a greater interest in the reestablishment of order, of fuel supplies, of food deliveries, of water, of medical services, of schools.

The only reason “constabulary non-peacekeeping”could be expected to generate violence was if it did not seek to restore normal life. Instead, the PNAC Manifesto anticipates ongoing hostilities both inside the newly acquired zone of democratic peace and outside it in seeking toe extend it. In other words, Constabulisim is simply ongoing war at another level. A lesser included case.

This is the first indication that the New American Century has made a radical departure from the structures of international law and conflict management evolved laboriously since Grotius. Everyhting the PNAC Manifesto says indicates that “constabulary” operations are to be regarded as simply a penumbra of war -- an ongoing violence generating “security shaping” within a zone of democratic peace.

Fighting A Lesser Included Peace

How does an army “shape” a peace? What does it mean to “shape the security environment.” The answer to this question is as nauseating as discovering the true meaning of “constabulism”.

Shaping a security environment is something that prison wardens do. It consists in prescribing lock-downs, conducting unannounced searches, the infliction of summary “lesser included” punishments, the imposition of conditions for minor benefits, and so on.

It was no lapse that PNAC talks of the army (constabulary) as “shaping the peace” and “shaping the security environment”. What is meant is that the military is going to control the parameters of existence outside any theatre of actual conventional war and the the “zone of democratic peace” is to be conceived as nothing more than a regional lock-down.

When the PNAC Manifesto speaks of a military capable of “long-term, independent constabulary operations” it means two things;

1) that the mission is not a temporary peacekeeping/ order maintaing operation until such time as civilian authority can be reestablished but rather that

2) it is an occupation which is independent from, unreliant upon and not answerable any civilian institution or authority.

The constabulary units are preeminent, supreme, and they alone decide what is to be. It also means that these military stompers and shapers are not dependent on our own related institutions which might be encumbered by statutory obligations or a feeble concern for norms of law. Constabulism is a law unto itself.

In order to shape the security environment,

“These forward-based, independent units will be increasingly built around the acquisition and management of information. This will be essential for combat operations – precise, long-range fires require accurate and timely intelligence and robust communications links – but also for stability operations.”

thus they should have,

“ have their own human intelligence collection capacity, perhaps through an attached special forces unit if not solely through an organic intelligence unit“

and should be configured with

"combat service support personnel with special language, logistics and other support skills."

because the units involved

“will require the ability to understand and operate in unique political-military environments, ...

and will be

“required to maintain peace and stability in the regions they patrol, provide early warning of imminent crises, and to shape the early stages of any conflict – precise, long-range fires require accurate and timely intelligence and robust communications links – but also for stability operations."

Once again it is necessary to unravel, the unique blend of contradictions the PNAC mavens have brewed up.

When the Manifesto makes reference to “forward-based, independent units” it is not talking, in the first instance, of forward striking forces landing, penetrating and invading new territory. The matrix of “zones of democratic peace” are themselves the “forward based” new “American security perimeter.” Thus, while the mission of the forces entails extending the security perimeter, what the Manifesto is here talking about is “security” operations within the forward based perimeter.

Of course, as has been shown, “secure and extend” are seamlessly connected operations; so seamless in fact as to result in weirdly constructed phrases like:

"shaping “the early stages of any conflict – precise, long-range fires require accurate and timely intelligence and robust communications links – but also for stability operations."

Striking out the part that refers to early stages of an extending operation, it becomes clear that what is called for is acquisition of sufficient intelligence “for stability operations” within the “peace” zone. To understand what this entails, we have to again pause to think about the meaning of words.

The word “intelligence” signifies a creature’s ability to use its mental faculties in an efficient, versatile, creative, and useful manner. In the 19th century the word began to be applied metaphorically to institutions which of course have no brain and cannot be said to be either intelligent or stupid. In this metaphorical sense, “intelligence” became practically synonymous with “knowledge of something” or “information”. However, the original sense was not entirely lost so that the word could also refer to an institution’s ability to gather information. -- which is the closest a corporate entity can come to having an IQ.

Traditionally speaking, military intelligence is concerned with acquiring information as to the location, size and battle plan of opposing theatre forces. As war became more industrialized, military intelligence also brought within its purview information as to armaments, production capacity and sustainability. But in all events “intelligence” was directed at an identifiable combatant enemy and sought specific types of information.

In the sense of “information” corporate, police, military intelligence also seeks knowledge of something specific and usually from specific parties or classes of people. Just as military intelligence seeks specific information about an identified opponent, so police intelligence plants undercover agents and spies upon specific people or groups reasonably suspected of engaging in specific crimes for information about those crimes.

Assuming that this traditional definition (more or less widely construed) fits with the task of "amplifying" zones of democratic peace, It has nothing to do with with the separate and distinct task of "securing" (i.e. traditional peacekeeping). Who is the enemy in a non-battlefield zone? Traditionally speaking there is no enemy; there is only a civilian population that is no doubt demoralized and resentful, but is not engaged in hostilities.

What is the “intelligence” to be gained? Certainly not “battlefield” intelligence because there is no battlefield within the zone of democratic peace. So, then, information about what and from whom?

When the Manifesto talks about “organic” intelligence units, it means that kind of intelligence acquired by penetrating into society; through infiltration on the one hand or extracting (detaining) people on the other. When it speaks of gaining an “understanding” of the “politico-military” environment what it means is acquiring information from anyone about anything. In contrast to the word “knowledge” -- which is always of something -- the word “understanding” is broader and encompasses awareness of a random range of variables. The term “politico military environment” simply means anything in the surroundings which could have a political or military implication -- i.e. anything.

Under the PNAC constabulary regime, information gathering is total and free form, encompassing anything of potential interest to brewing conflicts, (to be shaped) to an understanding of who is connected to whom in a given neighborhood. This is not “intelligence” in the traditional sense of finding answers to specific questions it is rather simply data mining. General free form information gathering.

The difference is critical because data mining means interrogating anyone in the security zone as a “potential suspect” not because he is a potential suspect or even an an actual one, but rather because anything he knows might be potentially useful, or as they say, is potentially usefully.

The difference is critical also because data mining -- once accepted -- simply destroys the concept of arbitrariness.

In traditional military or criminal intelligence there is always a specific suspect and question in mind. Rounding up people without a specific suspicion or specific question is consider “arbitrary” and unlawful. Who would want to live in a society where he or his wife or children could be yanked off the street and hauled off for questioning without specific cause much less notice, advisement?

But in the world of data mining no specific information is sought. What counts is is the possible relation between apparently unconnected and insignificant pieces of data. Since any person in the security zone can possess such a piece of connect able data no arrest is “arbitrary” and every one is a potential “suspect” in “possession of potential information” .

And of course since anyone is suspect of having potentially useful information howsoever useless it might seem to be at the moment, it is easy to forget why we are interrogating him altogether, and just simply beat him up by way of affirmative pacification.

As a result of the hybrid task, military intelligence gets twisted into meaning general unfocused intelligence run by the military in non-battlefield zones. in order to maintain occupation and prevent the eruption of resistance. “Intelligence” is metamorphosed into data mining which becomes the excuse for wholesale door smashing, draggings, detentions, interrogations and in general boot-stomping, boot smashing, ass kicking, terrorization of the population in general.

Confidence is the foundation of all civil society which cannot function without expectations of integrity, confidentiality and security “in one’s person, papers and effects.” Data-mining is under-mining. A society that is “organically” penetrated by spies, informers and extraction-actions is not society that has been “rebuilt” to be democratic and prosperous but one that has been subverted and consumed.

Under the PNAC’s new Constabulary Order the secured zone of peace is just as much in a state of violence as the extended zone of peace. The only difference is that the “enemy within” is more pathetically helpless than the “enemy without”.

Safety is War. Total Safety is Total War

It is not for nothing that the Russians have called the neocon manifesto another Mein Kampf. Forthrightly and without shame its sets forth a goal of global domination for its own sake. But next to neocon megalomania, Mein Kampf seems almost restrained and philosophical.

According to the Manifesto, the American led security-order will require the United States to

maintain multiple full theatre wars in conjunction with
long term constabulary operations
that secure and amplify zones of democratic peace
and shape security environment

and what this means has now become clear. But it is still only half the story. In in paroxyms of truly Strangelovian Joy, the PNAC mavens go on to declaim that the New American Security Order requires, us to

“CONTROL THE 'NEW INTERNATIONAL COMMONS" or SPACE AND “CYBERSPACE,”

Not only does the Manifesto call for” the creation of a new military service – U.S. Space Forces – with the mission of space control” The PNAC’s goal of “space control” is to prevent anyone else from having access to outer space and to use outer space for the placement military weapons that can strike anywhere on earth from the push of a button in some bunker in Wyoming.

But even more lethal is the Neoscum’s call for military missions to be extended to the new “battlefield” of the internet.

The Manifesto begins by complaining that terrorist groups (including by its own count the EZLN peasant autonomy movement in Chiapas, Mexico) use the internet for “propaganda” and “recruitment”. The notion that “terrorists” are having applicants sign up through e-applications is, of course, inane. In reality, any recruitment occurs through the fact of propaganda, and propaganda is what free speech is all about. Although there are always problems when a Government starts to exercise so-called free speech, it can be assumed for the present that it would be equally legitimate for the United States or any other party to use the internet to make its own and contrary propaganda.

However, the “competitive market place of idea” as Justice Brandeis put it is not how the PNAC conceives of “cyberwar” None other than Donald Scumsfeld, signatory to the Manifesto, and currently Secretary of War, has stated that the U.S. military needs to engage in disinformation campaigns.

Just as data-mining is not the same as intelligence gathering, so too disinformation is not the same as propaganda. All propaganda is interpretative. It argues an interpretation of and from given facts. Almost everyone’s propaganda engages in some “fact-massaging” -- playing up those facts that are helpful to the argument and omitting facts that are inconvenient. Disinformation is far more toxic. It consists in planting false facts under false identities, or using false identities to generate conflict or confusion and to induce social disorientation. . Like a person spun around to the point of staggering dizziness, disinformed society is one that simply cannot function as social organism; it is simply humanoid putty.

Thus, in addition to destroying language so that “words no longer have their original and intended meaning” the neocons want to destroy information in general so that none of us any longer can say for sure that what is reported as fact was really a fact or only a lie. This is the ultimate heteronomy that destroys everything.

Not quite... there still remains your young son on the cusp of manhood.... The neocons call for radical reconfiguring of the Army in terms that exceed any Stangelovian orgasm

"Future soldiers may operate in encapsulated, climate-controlled, powered fighting suits, laced with sensors, and boasting chameleonlike “active” camouflage. “Skin-patch” pharmaceuticals help regulate fears, focus concentration and enhance endurance and strength."

The PNAC plan for Neocon Youth calls for our sons to be turned into doped up murderous Borg units.

It is a fatal mistake to think of the Neocon movement as a political opposition that can be met on the customary field of polemical and electoral give and take. For only the brain of a monster, and not that of a man, could misconceive such a “Project” whose workings must finally bring about the collapse of human civilization and turn this world into a desert waste. No - this movement is an invasive disease and every single goddamn, misbegotten neocon, von kopf zum fuss, is a malignant, infected, stinking shit in vaguely human form. The devil himself would be revolted.

©WCG, 2003

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THUG POLITIK -- The Neo Con Agenda for a New American Century, Part I

Introduction

In several previous posts, I have reported on the Neocon agenda for the so-called “New American Century” as embodied in the PNAC report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses, (Sept. 2000). Although this Neocon Manifesto has antecedents in Pentagon position papers drafted by Cheney in 1991-1992 (see U.S. Strategy Plan calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop, New York Times, 8 March 1992) and was later re-packaged into a tonier official verison (The National Security Strategy of the United States, Office of the President, September 2002.), the PNAC report remains the core expression of Bush Administration policy.

On its face, the Neocon agenda is merely an extension by degrees of existing US policies and geopolitical practices. Since its founding, the United States has pursued a policy of extending its zones of hegemony (viz., the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, etc..) But that difference of degree is one that now produces a difference in kind. The Neocon Manifesto does more than call for a continuation and “advancement” of existing policy, it insists on an enhancement of the means by which that that policy is to be accomplished. This “enhancement” is so encompassing and indifferent to other values that it metamorphoses into an end in itself so that the neocon agenda becomes a radical departure from existing practices and constitutes a threat to civilization itself.

Distilled to its infected essence, the Manifesto sets forth a nihilistic theory of might as the basis for “global” policy. According to the Manifesto, the goal of U.S. policy should be “preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the preeminence of U.S. .military forces.” While “might is right” is an old and tiresome adage, what is new is the technological scope, purview and penetration of means by which power is to be exercised.

To “preserve and enhance this American peace” the Manifesto sets out four core military missions: (1) to defend the American homeland; (2) fight and decisively win multiple, (3) simultaneous major theater wars; perform the “constabulary” duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions; (4) and to transform U.S. forces to exploit the technological advances.

In reality, however, the Manifesto’s ideological structure is much simpler. As shall be seen, it’s core principle is simply to project-power. From this it necessarily follows that the United States must seek to extend its hegemony . It also follows, of necessity, that U.S. policy (i.e. power projection) has to be exercised preemptively and unilaterally since there is nothing to negotiate or consult about. Lastly, it follows, that areas over which the United States has gained control must continuously be subjected to ongoing constabulary “shaping” in order to maintain U.S. dominance. This “Pax Americana” has nothing to do with lifting the world into a new era of shared prosperity and peace. It is simply an Orwellan nightmare of routinized state aggression and terrorisms.

Thug Staat was conjured up well before 9/11 and has nothing to do with the so called fight against terrorism or meeting an actual geopolitical threat. Although this agenda is framed in terms of geo-political policy, of political and practical necessity it has domestic applications and consequences. It is something Americans should be concerned with and which they ignore at their own peril.

The ensuing analysis focuses on the the Neocons themselves say explicitly in their Policy Manifesto and what the meaning and implication of their words is. But this linguistic analysis should be read in context of ongoing realities currently taking place.

I bring it up again, because altohugh the Report’s tenets are becoming more broadly known, it is sitll being treated as simply a think tank paper among many and as essentially a proposal for more defense spending. It is not generally seen as an encompassing policy paper whose objectives are being unfolded before our eyes. And it is not seen as a civil policy paper the aims of which is to revolutionize the US into a frank and unfettered police state

I

Power Projection, Preeminence and Preemption

Although occasionally and thinly masked as a crusade to bring the gospel of “American Values” to parts of the world languishing in despotism and darkness, the Neocon’s core policy objective is simply to project US power and “extend” so-called zones of democratic peace..

There is only one way to “project power” and that it is to use it -- to punch someone in the face. Power is not an idea and cannot be argued. Power is a physical substance in action -- in mathematical terms, mass x acceleration. While power can be alluded to and threatened, its “projection” requires exercising force against an opposite or yielding mass.

Power projection requires a projectee, something or someone against which power makes itself known. It is an interesting question whether power (as opposed to pure motion) can exist in a vacuum; but supposing it can, it is meaningless because in the absence of opposition there is no effectiveness to gauge. Even when we speak abstractly of “power” as a thing in itself, we necessarily imply its effectiveness over or against something. Power may subsist in a state of latency like a relaxed bicep; but to say “his arm is powerful” means nothing and conveys without envisioning even in the most general way the arm’s power overcoming the resistance of something.

Thus, if the Neocons had said no more they would have said it all. Everything else in PNAC doctrine is contained within and unfolds from the core premise of power projection, once that concept is fully contemplated and its brutal essence comprehended. Their core policy from which all else flows is simply to go about kicking ass. It is beside the point to speak of a “strategies” because power projection is not conceived as a means but rather stated as an end itself.

However, if there were any doubt that this was the intended meaning, such doubts were laid to rest by the PNAC Manifesto’s own repeated coupling of “power projection” with phrases such as “extend zones of democratic peace”.

In fact, stripped to its naked core, the Manifesto is a roll-call for Global Conflict and War. It calls upon the United States to be able to conduct multiple full theatre wares while also engaging in regional “stability” operations and while “deterring” “rogue states that might be able to resist while at the same time pushing America’s secuirty perimeter “eastward” against Russia.

“the first order of business in missions such as in the Balkans is to establish security, stability and order. American troops, in particular, must be regarded as part of an overwhelmingly powerful force."

In the Caucasus

“U.S. Army Europe should be redeployed to Southeast Europe, while a permanent unit should be based in the Persian Gulf region.”

In Europe

As the “American security perimeter in Europe is removed eastward, this pattern will endure, although naval forces will play an import ant role in the Baltic Sea, eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, and States should seek to establish – or reestablish – a more robust naval presence in Southeast Asia, marked by a long-term, semi-permanent home port in the region,”

All of these places are considered to be the new “American security frontier” and although, when talking about military “capacities” the Manifesto appears to imply simply being prepared for potential conflict, its stated goals of “power projection” and its enumeration of specific “security zones”, make it abundantly clear that the PNAC Manifesto envisions a permanent state of global war.

When PNAC speaks of power projection it does not do so metaphorically. It does not mean the “power” of the American Example or the “projection” of ideas. It does not mean extending democracy through a shining example others will want to imitate; nor does it mean extending democractic values through coordinated work with and within international institutions and structures. It means none of that.

It also does not mean “projecting” power by way of demonstration as in the test exploding of an atom bomb or the proverbial shot across the bow. Strictly speaking such actions are simply threats rather than projections; but even assuming that the word “projecting” could be understood to include mere boasting, chest thumping and flag waving, the fact remains that the word “project” includes much more. In geo-political terms, the projection of power necessarily includes the projection of that power into other places.

The Manifesto unmistakably means to extend our zones of control by military means. That can only be done by projecting into someone else’s zone, which is what used to be called “war”.

It follows from the predicate principle of power projection, that diplomacy as a means of adjusting conflicts is irrelevant. The premise bears repeating. The neocon Manifesto does not subordinate the exercise of power as a means to some ulterior good; rather, power projection is the desired state. Once it has been decided that the goal is to project & extend, there is noting to consult about and nothing to negotiate. Unilateralism is the necessary correlative of power projection.

In fact, even as a means of collaboration, diplomacy is displaced because working with others presupposes accommodating their interests and accepting their advice. However, such collaboration can only serve to diminish the goal-state of U.S. preeminence. This does not mean that other countries may not be enlisted, like privates in an American Army, to do as we say. But for the U.S. to project its power, other countries as considered partners simply stand as a detraction.

The so-called Bush Doctrine of preemptive strikes also follows as a necessary correlative. The logic is simple. Dominance requires submission. Power projection, necessarily entails diminishment of another. Full spectrum dominance requires a correlative full spectrum impotence. It follows that anyone else’s mere capacity to possibly resist us (however pathetically) is an afront to out full spectrum dominance and must be dealt with summarily as a matter of course -- i.e. preemptively.

“... weak states operating small arsenals of crude ballistic missiles, armed with basic nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction, will be a in a strong position to deter the United States from using conventional force, no matter the technological or other advantages we may enjoy. Even if such enemies are merely able to threaten American allies rather than the United States homeland itself, America’s ability to project power will be deeply compromised.”

“Potential rivals...and adversaries ... are rushing to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons as a deterrent to American intervention in regions they [sic] seek to dominate.”

“If the American peace is to be maintained, and expanded, it must have a secure foundation on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence.”

It is an amusing question who is the party seeking to “expand” or acquire dominance over any given region. What is clear is that the Manifesto sets out a policy of striking at any so-called “rogue regimes” that may “may wish to develop deterrent capabilities” by “cobbling together a minuscule ballistic missile force.” American preeminence demands no less!!

Of course, in any given case, a demand may be made before hand. But this is not the opening gambit for negotiations but simply the preliminary to a preemptive strike. In fact, as often as not, the demand for something impossible and alleged non-compliance is simply a preliminary designed for Homeland consumption.

The Manifesto does not rule out alliances but makes clear that they are only for the short term as they advance power projection. In other words cynically use others or institutional only as they are useful and utterly subservient to the demands of US power projection.

While here and there in the Manifesto traditional strategic and policy language can be found concerning American “interests”, the expansion of prosperity (for whom?) or the “prudent” use of force, these are mere retrograde hold-overs. The volume and tone of the PNAC report as a whole makes clear that diplomacy has been replaced with demand. The unecessariness of this substitution is beyond belief.

Following upon the earliest years of the Cold War, the United States was extraordinarily adept at using international institutions to advance its (corporate) interests. The whole rest of the world understood this perfectly. Only the ignorant morons that comprise the Amurkan electorate could come to the deranged conclusion the United Nations detracted from and infringed upon our interests. The UN and its agencies, the OAS and NATO, the World Bank, the IMF and scores of NGO’s all but do our bidding the world over. From time to time the U.S. has had to make minor adjustments of its bidding to accommodate the sensibilities of others. From time to time it has had to allow a bit of another’s bidding. For the price of such trivial and occasional compromises, international structures but serve to advance American (corporate) interests.

The Neocon dementia (and it is truly a psychotic derangement) is that even this is too much. Any give is weakness and detracts from “pre-eminence”. Such Anglican notions as primus inter pares, is alien to most of the neocons who have tortured the idea into primus supra omnes.

Are they right? If these institutions almost always do our bidding anyway, why bother with the pretence? Because manners are everything and pretences like manners serve useful purposes.

The fundamental pretence of diplomacy and international law is that all states are co-equal members of the Comity of Nations. Of course, on a positivist basis, it is utter nonsense. Gambia (wherever the hell it is) is nowhere near an equal of Holland, much less China. But receiving the Gambian ambassador with equal ceremony and listening with respect to the position of the Government of Gambia reminds us that right is not coterminous with might and that as often as not is to be found among the weak, the despised and the rejected among men.

Quia respexit humilitatem ancillae suae; et Esurientes implevit bonis.

Pretence requires us to listen to others’s concerns and to widen or narrow our own scopes to accommodate them. We will have to listen to the advice of others which may (mirabilis dictu) actually furnish us with something that ought to be considerd and which we in our preeminence have overlooked. Most importantly, keeping up the pretences requires us to dress our interests in rationales and arguments that acknowledge and conform to certain social principles, generally accepted ultimate goods and so on.

The punks of Thug Politik may think that this is just a matter of sound-good sound bites for a well full of applauding morons or tinsley lies to keep French Foreign Ministers at bay. It can be reduced to that, but well done the “rationale” implicitly accepts the the principle it argues.

Pretence is at the heart of the Rule of Law. As Aristotle put it two millenia ago, language enables us to “decide the just and unjust, the expedient and the inexpedient.” It enables us to come to conclusion by some means other than the growl, the tooth and the fang. We have language so that we can explain to others and listen to their complaints and in so doing we accept certain ineffable princples of equity, cooperation, respect. These foundation blocks of civilization require manners and are diametrically opposed to unilaterally kicking ass and preeminently doing what you want. But the neocon attitude is that power projection “is nothing to be ashamed about;” [sic] manners are a pansy Frenchie sort of thing.

Not only are unilateralism and preemption implicit in power projection, power projection as policy is fundamentally antithetical to the cellular structure of civilization.

©WCG, 2003

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A War for Bananas? - Part VIII, ThugPolitik -- Full Spectrum Dominance

Following the election of President Clinton, Dick Cheney and his cohorts in the Reaganite bureaucratic infrastructure went to work preparing for the day of the eventual resumption of power. As previously reported (Fear and Loathing in the New American Century) the doctrine was given an initial airing in a “white paper” put out by the New American Century Org., a think tank rustled up {ie. founded} by conservative publisher William Kristol, (with defense industry money), for the specific purpose of promoting the Cheney/ Rumsfeld/ Wolfowitz doctrine of "full-spectrum dominance".

Stated simply the doctrine hold s that the US should control military, economic and political development worldwide by whatever means necessary and convenient, from cyber to nuclear war and all methods in between. In other words, “I’m the boss around here, and no that’s that.” In the words of the white paper, the United States "must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." In other words, the doctrine regards any “potential” rivalry as an “actual” threat and calls for the use a full spectrum military response as needed, from secret infiltrations, dirty wars, to nuclear blasts to keep other nations humble. It also calls for disinformation and the use of the internet as a weapon, presumably to keep everyone ignorant.

Published in September 2000, two years before Bush’s first State of the Union Address, it branded Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” Its authors recommended that the Pentagon take preemptive measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in such countries as North Korea, Iraq, and some of the former Soviet republics. The document made no mention of collective action through the UN, stating that "we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted...."

But the paper was not even principally concerned with the Axis of Evil, hidden in the text of ThugPolitik was a concern for resurgent Russian and Chinese power. It described Russia and China as “potential” threats and warned that Germany, Japan, and other industrial powers might be tempted to rearm and acquire nuclear weapons if their security was threatened, and this might start them on the way to competition with the United States.

In September 2002, the Kristol “white paper” was put on White House paper and became official U.S. Policy under the title “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”. Although the paper added some rhetorical embellishments about promoting democracy and finding the fountain of youth, its principle premise and objective was simply to maintain the United States in a position of sole global power.

Uri Avneri and Israeli leftists in the peace movement complain that the U.S. is using Israel for its own geo-political purposes. Neo-nazi right wingers in the U.S. and elsewhere complain that the new Youngers of Zion are using the U.S. to advance Jewish aims. Whatever the case, there is an undeniable parallelism between Israeli/ Likud policy in the smaller universe of the Middle East and the US/Bush policy in the greater universe of the world. As Israel must be the sole power in the Middle East, so the U.S. must be the sole global super-power, including the Middle East. The authors of America’s New Century would not deny the parallelism, they would only dispute that it presents any problem. To them, What’s good for Israel is good for the U.S. and vice versa. In a curious way, they speak the same talk as Saddam Hussein or the most fervently anti- Zionist Arab.

This was hardly Bush senior's view of America's role in the world.

Qui Bono?

Is the looming war a “war for oil” as the placards say? The existence of oil fields in the area, the deals that have been made with respect them thus far, the undeniable importance of oil in the modern world and the evident interests various parties have in gaining access and or control to it -- all these factors render it absurd to answer anything but “yes”. But there is little evidence so far that American oil companies (Big Oil) are pushing the Administration to seize Iraqi oil production facilities, in the way they once were pushing Franklin Delano Roosevelt to invade Mexico in order to seize-back nationalised oil.

On the other hand there is ample evidence that circles within the U.S. political establishment have elaborated Israeli security interests (as perceived by the Likudists) into a more General Theory of Hegemony, that resonates with American jingoists while providing an ideological “security umbrella” to Israel.

But while that may well be the case, it also has to be said that it takes many tugboats to push a big liner. Rarely is policy in the mass imperial state the result of any one qui or any one bono. It is usually the result of a confluence of forces, in which various players succeed in cajoling and co-opting one another. More important that asking which singular who is benefited is understanding who the who’s are, what interests and weaknesses they have and how they stand to use or be used.

©WCG, 2003
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A War for Bananas? - Part VII, Oil and Water - The Israeli Factor

No story on the Middle East can be complete without taking Israel into account. While peace groups in Israel favor compromise and coexistence with moderates in the Arab world willing to do the same, Israeli government policy for the past 20 years has been dominated by the irredentist Likud, the successor to so called Revisionist Zionism with its frankly racialist and colonialist ideas. Given this premise, Israeli security is based on a stark equation: Israel must be strong and the surrounding countries must be kept weak.

When one recalls the to-Heaven shrieking furore that surrounded the American sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in the 1970’s it is easy to see how Iraq would be the bete noire in Israeli strategizing. Keeping Iraq weak is not simply a matter of reducing its army or constraining its armaments. More fundamentally it is a question of depriving it of its major geo-political asset. A petro-servient Iraq is not a threat to anyone.

One does not need to be a rocket scientist to understand Israeli interests in the situation. According to the Asia Times, an active promoter of Israeli interests is a so-called "former" Israeli intelligence agent, Yousef Maiman, president of the Mehrav Group Maiman is a "Special Ambassador", to Turkenistan as well as a citizen [!] of the same gas republic by presidential decree. According to the Times, nobody knows where Mehrav's money comes from; but the Times quotes the Wall Street Journal, as reporting that it is actively involved in advancing the "geopolitical goals of both the US and Israel" in Central Asia.

What are those goals? Maiman is quoted as saying: "Controlling the transport route is controlling the product." That certainly dovetails with statements by the EIA. The Mehrav Group itself has accordingly joined in promoting the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which provides the further advantage of being easily extended to bring oil directly to “thirsty” Israel. Magal Security Systems, an Israeli company, is also set to provide the security for the 2,000 km long Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline Picking up a story disclosed by Israel peace groups, the Times also reports that Mehrav is involved in a “murderous project” to reduce the flow of water to Iraq by diverting water from the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers to southeastern Turkey.

In an article in the New York Review of Books, Frances FitzGerald (9/02) argued that Israel and its lobbyists in the United States want the destruction of Iraq on pure geo-political grounds independent of oil issues. He points out that “years before the Bush administration took office Rumsfeld and [Deputy Defense Secretary Paul] Wolfowitz were calling for [Hussein’s] overthrow on the grounds that he posed a danger to the region, and in particular to Israel”

In January 1998 they, along with the neo-conservative William Kristol and others associated with Kristol's Project for a New Century, wrote President Clinton that if Saddam acquired the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, he would pose a threat to American troops in the region, to Israel, to the moderate Arab states, and to the supply of oil. Four months later they went to capitol hill to beat this drum before congress.

In June 1999 Wolfowitz complained that “the containment of Iraq is failing. The United States needs to accelerate Saddam's demise if it truly wants to help the peace process." Wolfowitz was implying that with Saddam Hussein eliminated, Israel could choose the peace it wanted with the Palestinians. The cabal kept it up past the elections. Since September 11, William Kristol and associates have been urging Bush to see Israel's fight against terrorism as America's battle to make war on Saddam Hussein, as both Sharon and Peres have urged.

On April 15 2002 Kristol and Robert Kagan wrote that Bush should not play any role as Middle East peace negotiator. "The road that leads to real security and peace—the road runs through Baghdad." One week later, a senior Israeli official confirmed that “Pentagon officials” [i.e Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz] were pushing the White House to bring down Hussein before anything else. With Hussein out of the picture, they argued, Israel could solve the Palestinian problem on its own terms.

As documented in an article in Counterpunch e-zine, Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, John Bolton have strong affiliations with the Likud. Feith and Richard Perle collaborated in authoring a 1996 study for then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in which Hussein’s overthrow (aka “regime change”) was described as “an important Israel strategic objective in it own right -- [and] as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions.” The study urged a preemptive strike. (See. A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm (http:// www. israeleconomy. org/strat1.htm).)

Nothing has changed since. In August 2002, Israeli Deputy Interior Minister Gideon Ezra told the Christian Science Monitor that a U.S. attack on Iraq would help Israel impose a new order without Arafat. “The more aggressive the attack is, the more it will help Israel against the Palestinians.” he said.

According to Independent columnist Robert Fisk, Jewish American leaders talk about the advantages of an Iraqi war with enthusiasm, although Bush and Blair keep this aspect of the issue carefully under wraps. According to Fisk, Rumsfeld’s allusions to the “old” Europe were a thinly veiled reference to French antisemitism and collaboration with the Nazis.

Whether they were or not, it was hardly surprising that in a Wall Street Journal article, following Powell’s UN speech, Professor Eliot Cohen, of Johns Hopkins University, suggested that European nations' objections to the war might – yet again – be ascribed to "anti-semitism of a type long thought dead in the West, a loathing that ascribes to Jews a malignant intent.” What kind of intent is it that would seek to divert Iraq’s water to the Levant? “The France and Germany that oppose this war,” Fisk says, “are the "new" Europe, the continent which refuses, ever again, to slaughter the innocent.”

©WCG, 2003
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A War for Bananas? - Part VI, When First You Fail, Try.... What?

The question raised by the foregoing denouement is whether the crisis in Iraq is simply an oil-grab. The evidence points to an affirmative answer; but it is by no means a question of “simply” since private prospects -- to the extent they are actually urged by the oil companies -- must be pieced into and justified by an over-arching national strategy and it is not entirely clear that a national strategyhas been coherently resolved upon.

At the end of 2002, leading oilmen, exiled Iraqis and lawyers met behind the closed doors of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London. The meeting was entitled "Invading Iraq: dangers and opportunities for the energy sector".

According to the Guardian which ran the story, “One delegate said the entire day could be summarized with: "Who gets the oil?" If America changes the regime you might expect US companies to get it.” But, as the Guardian noted, “it maybe more complicated than that.”

The Iraqi oil industry was built up by Iraq Petroleum Co. (IPC) a consortium owned by BP, Exxon/Standard Oil, Mobil, Shell, and Partex. In 1972, IPC was nationalized by the revolutionary Iraqi regime. Negotiations over nationalization were fierce. Negotiators for IPC team had some extraordinary clashes with Saddam Hussein and Iraq's vice-president, wh0 threatened “any battle with the companies that was necessary" The Iraqis also threatened IPC with loss of Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti oil due to Arab solidarity. In February 1973, the IPC finally signed the nationalization agreement. IPC was compensated for its lost oil-fields, and by 1975 operations were taken over by the Iraq National Oil Co and the Northern Petroleum Organization.

Normally, IPC’s compensation would be deemed to terminate its rights. It is also a rule of international law that valid contracts survive regime changes. "The majority opinion is that if a government creates a [legal] title, it survives a change of government," Prof. Thomas Wäld told the Guardian. Doak Bishop, vice-chair of the Institute of Trans-national Arbitration agreed: "Regime change does not change the acquired rights companies have in the area. If the Russians and the French have legal rights in those fields, then a regime change would not oust them of those rights, but it could well get pretty messy."

The Americans, apparently, are of another view. Former CIA director James Woolsey, who is close to the Iraqi opposition groups, recently told the Washington Post: "It's pretty straightforward. France and Russia have oil companies and interests in Iraq. They should be told that if they are of assistance in moving Iraq towards decent government, we'll do the best we can to ensure the new government and American companies work closely with them. If they throw in their lot with Saddam, it will be difficult, to the point of impossible, to persuade the new Iraqi government to work with them."

In light of such belligerence, French complaints about “unilateralism” acquire a new accent.

No one, not even an upstanding oil company, could be expected to toss away manna from heaven (or from the bowels of the planet, as the case may be.) But it seems to be a characteristic of corporate culture that companies are as cautious as they are avaricious. American oil companies certainly understand that a destructive war would make it more expensive to rebuild Iraq’s oil facilities. They also understand that an unstable peace would make it more problematic to pump and transport it. Lastly, oil companies are not adverse to dealing with whatever regime it happens to be easiest to deal with be it Maoist Chinese, Fascist Chileans, Fundamentalist Muslims or Saddam Hussein. That unspecified “oilmen” might have met in London to discuss hypotheticals does not prove that oil companies are pushing the present policy.

Part of the difficulty in figuring out qui bono, is figuring out how to contextualize President Bush’s thuggish pronouncements. The one group to whom Bush’s public tantrums (“I’ve had it” “The Game is Up” “Saddam is finished” etc.) will not sound shocking is that class of American lawyer that deals in what is known as “settlement negotiations”. The claims of super-human patience, the feigned exasperation, the two-hour ultimatum coupled with an angry threat -- these are all the sorts of antics that go on behind the highly polished brass on front doors of “blue chip” law firms. The half of the conversation which the public hears sounds like some kind of “settlement negotiation” is taking place.... But with whom? The difficulty in assessing Bush’s ridiculous antics is that one does not know what offers and counter-offers have been made and rejected. It is a near certainty that the conversation we hear has nothing to do with weapons inspections which is little more than a noisy side-show, employing many, urged with earnestness and signifying nothing. That leaves us in the unenviable Thomist position of “knowing God by saying what he is not.”

While the anecdotal and symptomatic evidence points to the conclusion that the Bush Administration is resolved on war for the sake of oil, that same evidence also points to the bizarre fact that the Administration is at something of a loss as to what to do with the oil once it gets it. Complicating matters is the curious backward way the Administration as well as the Press speak about things.

In mid December 2002, about the same time oilmen and lawyers were meeting behind the closed doors of the Royal Institute, the U.S. State Department issued a communique stating that, the first session of the “Future of Iraq project working group on Oil and Energy” would convene on December 20-21, 2002 in Washington, DC. At this session, the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs would be hosting approximately 15 “Free Iraqis” for discussions regarding the current state of Iraq’s oil and energy sectors, scenarios for the restoration and modernization of Iraq's oil fields and other essential energy infrastructure; and management of the energy sector to meet the needs of the Iraqi people in the post-Saddam era. The meeting would be closed to the press.

A month later, at the beginning of January, the Houston Chronicle circulated a New York Times article on the Administration’s plans for the occupation of Iraq which, it said, “would amount to the most ambitious American effort to administer a country since the occupations of Japan and Germany at the end of World War II.” Although many elements of the plans were classified or still being debated, the occupation had two objectives: "preserve Iraq as a unitary state, with its territorial integrity intact," and "prevent unhelpful outside interference, military or nonmilitary.”

Buried in the middle of the long report, dealing with a pot-pourri of military and social issues, the article noted: "There is no more delicate question for the administration than how to deal with Iraq's oil reserves ... and how to raise money from oil sales for rebuilding without prompting charges that control of oil, not disarming Iraq, is Bush's true aim.”

One would think that the primary “story” was whether one should make war for oil not how the administration has to deal with a “delicate” appearance Nevertheless, in this oblique and almost buried way, the article went on to disclose that “Administration officials have been careful always to talk about Iraqi oil as the property of the Iraqi people.” At the same time, the White House was haunted by the nightmare that Saddam Hussein might deprive them of the desired prize, by destroying the fields. Administration officials were quoted as saying, “It's a big source of concern, and we are trying to take account of it as we plan how to use our military forces.”

Indeed. Speaking on 29 December, Secretary of State Collin L. Powell stated, "If coalition forces go into those oil fields, we would want to protect those fields and make sure that they are used to benefit the people of Iraq, and are not destroyed or damaged by a failing regime on the way out the door."

Once again, as almost every day, one has to pause to make sense out of the Administration’s extremely bizarre way of speaking. “If coalition [i.e. predominantly American] forces go into the oil fields” would they want to blow them up? Hardly. But if one “would want to protect those fields” going into them would not be a matter of possibly happening to be there (“if”). Why does Powell speak as if American forces might stumble into custody of oil fields and then have to do their fair and honest best to be good custodians? He speaks that way in order to avoid speaking truthfully, that the “true aim” of the Administration is to make a bee-line to those oil fields and seize possession of them. Hussein, apparently understood it that way, because in January the Iraqi government stated publicly it had plans to blow the fields up. Of course it was “a big source of concern.”

Once it is seen that the administration (and its echoes in the press) speak backwards, it is understood that seizing the oil fields is not the result of happening to have occupied Iraq, which is the result of going to war; rather, seizing the oil fields is the reason for occupying Iraq which is why the U.S. would go to war. Nevertheless, still talking as if control of oil is one of those collateral “effects” of war which would have to be managed somehow, as best one could, the Houston Chronicle/New York Times article continued “it is unclear how the administration plans to finesse the question of Iraq's role in the OPEC countries and who would represent occupied Iraq at the organization's meetings. [¶] The administration is already anticipating that neighboring Arab nations may accuse occupied Iraq of pumping oil beyond OPEC quotas. One official said Washington "fully expects" that the United States will be suspected of undermining the oil organization, and it is working on strategies, which he would not describe, to allay those fears.

One reason the official might not have described these strategies is that the administration is again deadlocked by a split that has plagued it since it took office. According to a 22 December 2002 story by the Los Angeles Times,the administration’s hawks want the United States to militarily seize, possess and control the oil fields whereas its doves “believe that it should be up to the Iraqis to decide how to rebuild their battered industry -- and which foreign oil companies will get to take part.”

It will hardly come as a surprise that the “hawks” are led by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, along with Richard Perle, among the chief protagonists of unilateral pro-consularity of American foreign policy. A report prepared by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, in December 2002, and delivered to Wolfowitz’s office, concluded that “the cost of the occupation, the cost for the military administration and providing for a provisional [civilian] administration, all of that would come out of Iraqi oil.” Another source told the press that a number of officials in Cheney’s officer were also urging that Iraq's oil funds be used to defray the cost of occupation. Yet another unnamed source stated that many senior administration officials were of the view that "It [the oil] is going to fund the U.S. military presence there. .... They will charge the Iraqis for the U.S. cost of operating in Iraq. I don't think they're planning as far as I know to use Iraqi oil to pay for the invasion, but they are going to use it to pay for the occupation."

Nor will it surprise that the doves are headed by Collin Powell who reflects the views of the Council on Foreign Relations and Rice University's Baker Institute which, the Los Angeles Times states, “is believed to represent the thinking of many U.S. officials.” One of said “officials” is Baker Institute energy analyst Amy Myers Jaffe, who told the Times that "A lot of us have confidence in people who were professionals in the Iraqi oil industry and left the country, and in people who are still there." In other words, these so-called “U.S. officials” are really the oil-company folks who want to be left alone to their own free-market devices dealing with “capable” neo-liberal Iraqi “counterparts”.

Also arrayed against the hawks are bureaucrats in the National Security Council, Justice Department and Federal Reserve banking system. Mike Anton, a National Security Council spokesman denied the existence of any plan to use oil funds to pay for occupation stating that the oil revenues would be used “not so much to fund the operation and maintaining American forces but for humanitarian aid, refugees, possibly for infrastructure rebuilding, that kind of thing.”

Justice Department lawyers are unsure whether any of the oil funds could legally be used to defray occupation costs or whether, on the contrary, they had to be held in trust for the people of Iraq. Laurence Meyer, a former Federal Reserve Board governor, who chaired a Center for Strategic and International Studies conference in November on the economic consequences of a war with Iraq, said that conference participants deliberately avoided the question of whether Iraq should help pay occupation or other costs. "It's a very politically sensitive issue," he said. Meyer did say however, that those officials who believed Iraq's oil could defer some of the occupation costs may be "too optimistic about how much you could increase [oil production] and how long it would take to reinvest in the infrastructure and reinvest in additional oil."

Indeed, a CFR-Baker report estimated that even if Iraq emerged from war with no additional damage to its oil infrastructure, its annual oil revenues probably wouldn't exceed $12 billion a year whereas the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost of an occupation would range from $12 billion to $48 billion a year, lasting for one and half years or more. In other words while the bureaucratic infighting continues, Bush continues to speak publicly of administering Iraqi oil “in trust” for the Iraqi people.

It is astonishing to think that at this late date the increasingly belligerent pronouncements of the administration doves might in fact mask a continuing split over what to do with the oil once it is seized -- in other words, what the objective of an invasion is in the first place. And yet it the public symptoms bespeak an internal confusion. It will be remembered that, last Summer and Fall, along with Jim Baker and other former Bush I advisors, Brent Scowfcroft took the unusual step of publicly criticizing Bush Jr.’s reckless unilateralism. In August 2002, Scowcroft weighed in against the war whoops of the Rumsfeld-Kristol- Wolfowitz-Perle crowd arguing that a unilateralist attack would “turn the whole region into a cauldron” and that, with nothing left to lose, Saddam might unleash his weapons of mass destruction and attack Israel. Since this latter option was somewhat far fetched, Scowcroft might have meant to say that Saddam that a unilateral attack might result in Hussein blowing up his own fields. Whatever the case, Scowcroft was adamant that the Administration’s policy should be built on a multilateral focus on terrorism ...not a unilateral war with Iraq

The Administration heeded at least half the advice and, as a result, it administration deviated back to the Security Council chamber where it labored to achieve Resolution 1441. In a joint interview this Friday (2/14), with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, on Public Television, Scowcroft was asked whether, in view of the unprecedented applause which greeted the French Foreign Minister’s remarks to the Council, he was “receiving any heat from within the administration”. What was interesting was not Scowcroft reply (he refused any)but rather the little squeak-like “Ha!” that involuntarily emitted from Albright.

©WCG, 2003
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A War for Bananas? - Part V, Politics on the Stump and the Politics of the Pump

Like the sun and the moon, the politics and the economics of the Iraq situation stand in an inverse but reflective relation. The geo-political face of the conflict is simple and fairly constant. Saddam Hussein is a brutal, belligerent dictator who must be got rid of or at least disarmed and “neutralized”. The geo-economic face of the conflict is complex and extremely fluid. The general premise here is that Saddam can be negotiated with and that the stability he affords is better than the chaos. The political face is characterized by periodic and much publicized “crises” followed by long intervals of quiescence in what is supposedly a steady effort to get rid of Saddam. The economic face is ever silent covering steady attempts to trade with Saddam while surfacing from time to time in order to deny doing any such thing. An example of these dual constellations is that, in 1996, while director of Central Intelligence, John M. Deutch headed up American efforts to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Hussein; but as of February 2000, Deutch sat on the board of Schlumberger Ltd., a multinational “shell” for US companies that was helping Baghdad service its oil rigs.

A brief and somewhat superficial summary of the past six years will give an idea of the curious dynamics surrounding Iraqi oil.

In 1996, the United Nations initiated the so-called oil-for-food program, which allowed limited and monitored sales of Iraqi oil in exchange for non-military and non dual-use goods. As of 1997, the Security Council removed any ceiling on the amount of oil Iraq could sell. However, it maintained a limit on the amount of spare parts Iraq could buy. As of June 1998 Iraq was allowed to buy only $300 million in spare parts every six months.

Complicating the situation, the United State government imposed sanctions on Iraq, which meant, in effect, that it prohibited American companies from doing business with the outlaw regime. But whereas Iraq could sell oil to anyone, it could only get the spare parts in needed from American sources which had built the original infrastructure. And if it could not get spare parts, it’s ability to pump and sell would be reduced. And so it stood; at least officially. According to U.S. government figures, American firms accounted for only a tiny share (about $400 million) of the nearly $10 billion in trade that has been conducted under the oil-for-food exemption. In reality, diplomats, industry officials and UN documents indicate that, between the summer of 1998 and Spring of 2000, American companies, operating through subsidiaries and affiliates, were buying oil and selling parts furiously, although they denied it in order to “comply” with the law.

One such company was Halliburton, the Dallas-based maker of oil equipment of which Dick Cheney was chairman and CEO until his election as vice-president. While the United States and Britain waged almost daily air strikes against military installations in northern and southern Iraq, Halliburton and other U.S. companies, were doing business with Saddam Hussein's government and helping to rebuild Iraq’s battered oil industry. Two such other companies were Dresser-Rand and Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Co., in which Cheney had major stock interests.

Prior to his election Dick Cheney was a long time critic of United States’ sanctions against Iraq which, he said, “penalized” American companies. They did not, however, greatly penalize Halliburton & Co. Although Cheney denied that Halliburton had business dealings “with” Baghdad, UN records showed that Halliburton held stakes in two “affiliates” that signed contracts to sell more than $73 million in oil production equipment and spare parts to Iraq.

Much the same obtains on the oil-buying side of the equation. In a speech to San Francisco’s Commonwealth Club, in November 1998 ,Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Chevron Corporation , Kenneth T. Derr, criticized US imposed unilateral sanctions against various countries. Derr went on at length belaboring the obvious fact that (unless there is only one source) unilateral sanctions “don’t work”. On the other hand, Derr said “It might surprise you to learn that even though Iraq possesses huge reserves of oil and gas -- reserves I'd love Chevron to have access to -- I fully agree with the sanctions we have imposed on Iraq. Why? Because .Iraq’s conduct has been so egregious that ... other countries have been willing to join the United States by adding sanctions of their own.” What he did not say was that at the very time, without “access to” the reserves themselves Chevron was purchasing oil from the reserves” via middlemen.

A month later, the United States initiated Operation Desert Fox and bombed Iraq. Baghdad retaliated by prohibiting U.S. oil companies from directly purchasing Iraqi crude. " Any company found supplying Iraqi crude to a country in a state of war with Iraq will be put on the blacklist and there will be a partial or full ban in dealing with it," said Iraqi Trade Minister Mohammed Mehdi Saleh.

Yet despite multi-lateral sanctions imposed against Iraq and despite unilateral sanctions imposed by Iraq, Chevron and Exxon managed to increase their purchases of Iraqi crude in 1999. According to Larry Goldstein, president of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Iraqi crude was the fastest growing source of imported crude amount to about 700,000 of the 2 million barrels of oil exported daily by Iraq or nine per cent of total U.S. oil imports. "The Chevrons and the Exxons of this world have to buy from the Russians, the French and the Chinese traders," said Goldstein. But, he added, "the U.S. spare parts industry is too dominant to ignore."

“Where does Iraq think its oil is going to go if it doesn't go to the U.S.?” asked one trader with a U.S. major oil company. Saudi Arabia, vowed to fill any disruption from Iraq, Iraq’s sanctions failed and Baghdad's penetration of the U.S. oil market soon surpassed pre-Gulf War levels.

In September 1999, more than 50 foreign companies attended an oil and natural gas technology exhibition in Baghdad, the first such gathering in 10 years. Most of the firms were from Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. No U.S. firms attended, although a high-level Iraqi oil official stated that Iraq was ready to deal with U.S. oil companies.

How Iraq was prepared to deal with foreign companies was another matter. A U.N. “Expert Report,” issued in March 2000, obliquely indicated that someone had floated the idea of foreign companies entering into “production sharing agreements” and/or “participating” in Iraq’s oil production. The Report states that the expert group “was advised, at Ministerial level, that in the current political environment...there would be no discussion on the matter of options for involving foreign oil companies in Iraq’s oil sector.”

The Report went on: “To sustain and increase oil production and export capacity it is the view of the experts that involvement of foreign companies would be helpful and, in principle, the Ministry of Oil welcomes this. .... However,... the Ministry of Oil declined to take part in discussions on this matter and was only willing to discuss the involvement of foreign companies through the use of short-term technical service contracts (“TSC’s”), such as well logging, pipeline pigging, and the drilling and work over of wells.” It would appear, however, that by the end of the following year the Ministry had modified its position at least to a point satisfactory to the companies, although getting there was a tad bumpy.

In October 2000, the Iraqi Oil Ministry expressed frustration with the slow pace of progress by Russian and Chinese firms; and, in January 2001, Shell announced that it had held talks with the Iraqi Oil Ministry regarding "potential opportunities". In March 2001, the Deputy Oil Minister announced that Iraq might terminate contracts with the Chinese and Russian companies. In July 2001, angered by France's perceived support for the U.S. "smart sanctions" plan, Iraq announced that it would no longer give French companies priority in awarding oil contracts, and would reconsider existing contracts as well. Iraq also announced that it was inclined to favor Russia, which has been supporting Iraq at the U.N. Security Council.

In October 2001 a joint Russian-Belarus oil company signed a service contract and Lukoil was granted its concession to spend $4 billion to develop a "super" oil field in southern Iraq In December 2001, the Turkish Petroleum International Corporation won a U.N.-approved contract to drill for oil in northern Iraq. It would appear that Iraq and France also resolved their difference as a recent (Fall 2002) report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs states that France Russia and China all have “potentially massive oil pacts” with Iraq and that “Saddam [Hussein] is believed to have offered the French company Total Elf Fina exclusive rights to the largest of Iraq's oil fields.”

In short, twists, turns, bumps and bombs, by the end of 2001 Iraq appeared poised to solve its oil problems and U.S. companies were not part of the solution. As of March 2000, the U.N. Expert Report had concluded in the direst of terms that Iraq was wasting its assets in order to sell them. “Although the effort of the Iraq oil industry has been enormous, and is notable for its effort to reinstate production after severe damage in a very short time, the lack of means to keep this industry in good shape in terms of capital, equipment and material, and also from the point of view of human resources, is very apparent. .... The oil industry is degrading, safety is below conventionally accepted standards, the environment is endangered, and the ultimate recovery potential of oil and gas in the fields is jeopardized. The current situation, if left unchanged, will lead inexorably to the demise of the oil industry.” In short, Iraq was engaged in the petro-equivalent of slash and burn agriculture.

But by the end of the following year the issues were resolved. Although nothing prevented U.S. companies from continuing to be passive end-buyers of crude, they were not in on the big deals. Moreover, it would appear that U.S. companies also stood to loose on the spare parts business because new infrastructure developed by France, Russia or China would not typically use American machinery.

Little is known of the negotiations in Baghdad, but it much of the blame for the last place showing by American companies can be laid at Washington’s door. As Cheney complained throughout the Nineties, U.S. regulations had hobbled American companies. These policies did not prevent end-runs, but neither did put wind in anyone’s sails. Diplomats interviewed for the Washington Post in February 2000 said Washington had been a greater obstacle for American businesses than Baghdad. The United States had placed "holds" on more than 1,000 contracts valued at $1.5 billion under the oil-for-food program, including some held by American companies. The March 2000 Expert Report Appendix likewise showed that over and over again repairs and construction were blocked by US objections that a screw or an adhesive had “dual use” capacity.

© WCG, 2003
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