Bring Back the People's Witan

It is time to abolish the U.S. Senate and to vest all legislative authority in a single representative house. The Senate is an oligarchical obstacle to democratic rule and has been the most singular cause of domestic conflict, clog-block and now, regression.

The reasons for the Senate's inherently anti-democratic nature are rooted both in history and its own peculiar procedures. As shall be explained, the Senate was and remains conceived as a body that represents institutional and "corporate" interests; i.e. "chunks of things," not people. Although this fact is typically gussied up in the fair-sounding rationale of protecting the "little states" what this really means is that the Senate exists to protect the interests of the big players in those little states. To make matters even more undemocratic and anti-egalitarian, the Senate's procedures give effective veto power to almost any one of those big players; and, as if that were not enough, the constitutional mechanism of six year term staggered elections makes the institution as a whole simply impervious to change. No groundswell -- not even a popular tsunami -- could change more than a third of the senate at any one time. Why and wherefrom such a political monstrosity?

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With typical bombast, Americans have been kneaded into thinking of the Senate as the “World’s Greatest Deliberative Body.” Drivel. That honour goes to the Roman Curia and next to the English House of Commons.

Just as inanely Americans have been taught to think of themselves as “inventing” democracy, the first and most perfect expression of which is the U.S. Constitution (of 1788). According to this particular litany, our Founding Fathers swept away the oppressive cobwebs of medievalism and established the rule of Republican Reason on a molehill in the bogs of the Potomac.

This too is nonense. As the English legal historian, Theodore Plucknet, has pointed out, the U.S. Constitution is an indelibly medieval document.

And so, in answer to the question, “Why and Wherefrom the Senate” one is inevitably led back to the soggy shores of the Thames.

In the Tenth Century, England was ruled by Anglo-Saxons. Central administration belonged to the King and a Council of advisers, the Witan, made up of the two archbishops, and assorted bishops, abbots, earls, kinsmen of the king, and great magnates.

The realm was divided into districts known as shires with each shire being subdivided into “hundreds” or “wapentakes”. Local administration was in the hands of ealdormen, from whence our “alderman” and the later English, “earl”. Shires were ruled by royal agents known as “reeves,” from whence our shireeves or sheriffs. Bishops and abbots ruled those lands which belonged to the Church. One or twice a year, shire leaders held “court” to take a census, hear major disputes over land and administer punishments for crimes committed.

Obviously, the King was not involved in all the day to day affairs of every shire, tun or wapentake; so that on a day to day basis local government was rule by ward-lords.

In contrast, it was to be expected that in matters governing the Realm as a whole the King would summon his council and rule with their advice and consent. In this respect governance would be broadly representative and would reflect the will or concurrence of the country’s political units. The Anglo-Saxon nobility was flexibly hereditary and the Church, of course, was open to all talent and was to this extent democratic. Taken as a whole, the government of England was that kind of limited democracy which could be characterized as a federal semi-hereditary oligarchy.

In 1066, William of Normandy conquered England and, for two generations or so, ran the Anglo-Saxons to ground. However, in its general structure, William’s government remained much the same as that of the King and his Witan. It was, after all, pretty much the standard mode of medieval government. The difference was that the Norman monarchs were very pro-active types, always seeking to push the envelope of “executive power”. William was very happy, indeed eager, to rule through his Council. He just wanted it to listen more and talk less.

It was from this pushing of the envelope that the English, and ultimately we Americans, got such things as the Common Law and the Jury. Always seeking to “streamline” and make government more efficient, William and his successors established uniform rules and regulations applicable in common to all shires and (now) counties. They made very active and nosey use of the twice yearly courts, requiring the “veniremen” to come and swear (jure) to inquire into this and that and render a true account (veredictum) of what was up in the county... and who was to be hanged. Needless to say, the locals pushed back and managed to turn the King's Instruments against him. Over time the jury became the expression of local control and independence against royal power.

Pushing back, the nobles also turned the King’s Council into a Parliament; i.e. Talk House. They wanted the King to talk less and listen more. As the result of this political dynamic, King Edward I, established the first regular or permanently sitting “Model Parliament” in 1295. Although, it cleary had roots in the Anglo Saxon Witan, the English Parliament is said to date from this time

The Model Parliament was a unicameral institution, and like the Witan of old, was comprised of ecclesiastics, noblemen, and representatives of the counties. It was “democratic” in the sense we have described; and, as the country slowly moved from the economics of feudalism toward the economics of capitalism, it became even more so by including “leading men” from the city or burroughs.

Until Andrew Jackson came along in 1830, no one thought of giving the unwashed man much of a say in anything so that England in 1295 was about as democratic as the United States five hundred years later.

As every English school boy knows, the “fortunes of Parliament” ebbed and flowed with current events. The monarchy was always demanding consent while the “peers of the realm” were equally insistant on demanding the right to advise.

In 1341, the borough “burgesses” got into the act as well. Hitherto, these lesser of the leading men had been more or less subservient to their greater peers. But the Black Death, changing economics and the Hundred Years War, now five years into the running, all began to affect “ordinary working middle class families” as the saying goes. These parliamentary commoners began to caucus separately on issues of common concern, and this ultimately led the split of Parliament into two Houses.

The split became final in 1376, when the Commons faction (not without back hand support from the nobles) elected a Speaker to present a list of grievances to the King and, going further, impeached various of the King’s ministers on charges of corruption and irregularity. “Edward’s War” was now in its Fiftieth Year and, in addition to higher taxes, had led to a regime that was both venal and repressive. The Commons was born in protest against corruption, war, and failure to promote the welfare of the middle-class.

The resulting bicameral Parliament reflected certain economic realities. Up through the middle of the 19th Century and certainly throughout the 18th, the landed Enlish aristocracy represented defineable and strong economic interests grounded mostly (but not entirely) in agriculture. In counterpoint, the English commons represented equally defineable and strong economic interests in industry, finance, and commerce. The competition between these two socio-economic forces played itself out in (1) the two party system and (2) a bicameral Parliament. The Tories and the Upper House, represented the cavaliers, and the “country” whereas the Whigs and the Lower House represented the puritans and the “city”.

Elizabeth I and Parliament

To say as much does not do justice to the myriads of fluctuations, fudgy alliances, and clear betrayals and beheadings that characterize the four centuries of English politics from 1376 to 1776. But in pertinent and salient part, the summary is correct.

What is important to bear in mind is that, from the beginning, that cluster of interests which coalesced into the House of Lords, represented territorial political and economic interests. Lord So-and-So, in Parliament, did not represent himself -- that is the view of a soap opera. He represented a corporate coalition of interests in the region over which he ruled. He was, in short, a Senator.

The American Founding Fathers took the concept of an Upper (Landed) House, and transposed it onto American soil. Although the Constitution abolished titles of nobility, the Federation maintained those separate regional configurations known as the “States”. These colonies become states were analogs to the medieval "estates" of England. In much the same manner as the Saxon and Norman kings had granted fiefdoms to their leading nobles or to ecclesiastical communities, these American colonies had been established by Royal Charter grant -- either to single men (as in the case of Pennsylvania and Maryland) or to an incorporated “society” of men. (as in the case of Massachussets). Each of these now independent States represented unique or particular economic interests and social realities. In giving these territorial entities, as such, a representation in Congress, the Founding Fathers created a “republican” House of Lords.

Just as Peers of the Realm were understood to represent "clusters of corporate interests" -- whether temporal or ecclesiastical, U.S. Senators were understood to represent the States as such and not the people in those states; and, until 1911, senators were appointed by the various state legislatures. Beginning in 1911 (effective 1913) the Constitution was amended to provide for the direct election of U.S. Senators. That same year the Parliament Act of 1911 effectively abolished the veto power of the House of Lords. Henceforth although the English Upper House could delay legislation enacted by the Commons, it could not defeat it.

Alas, the “democratization” of the U.S. Senate did not go half as far as the English Parliament Act. Despite their direct election “by the people” the U.S. Senate continued, as it always has, to represent the most reactionary, oligarchical interests afoot in the country. It continued to do so because, the larger the constituency represented the less connected the elected representative is to that individuals in that constituency.

For example, a given congressional district may consist of two or three big players (some major employer or occupational group), 10 medium size entrepreneurs and 10,000 ordinary Joes. The representative can't completely ignore any one group, and 6000 ordinary Joes fired up over some issue can easily outweigh the interests of one or more "heavyweights".

With the Senate, the dynamic works in just the opposite direction Because the candidate has to appeal to a larger electorate, the issues become formulated in gross and the push and pull of the bigger players becomes more important. The Framers understood the principle clearly and applied it candidly. American students are typically taught that the Senate was created to give "equal representation" to the "little" States. That is true. But what is just as typically overlooked is that representation for "little Delaware" really meant representation for the Big Players in "Little Delaware" which, today, turn out to be E.I. Dupont and some the world's biggest banks. What this means, in effect and practice, is that "little" AIG or wee Chase get to a voice and filibustering veto over national policy.

In apprising its role within the constitutional system, it is necessary to recognize the extent to which the U.S. Senate constituted a perversion of the parliamentary system.

There is no question that the Lords and Commons came to represent competing political and economic interests. This division was largely accidental but, in all events, the political cleavage in England was not between big guys and little guys, but between two rival modes of political-economy. The Tory /Lords versus Whig/ Commons conflict was essentially a battle between evenly matched big guys. Each represented their interests up front like honest contenders and let the better cheater win! This after all is what democracy is all about: factions pushing their interests.

The Tory versus Whig dynamic, as transplanted to the United States, played itself out in the conflict between North and South; and, as everyone knows, for years, the Senate played a deadlocking role in this conflict. But the transplanting included a twist. In the United States, the rivalry between equal but opposed modes of economy played itself out in the Senate, not between an upper house Senate (representing landed interests) and a lower House of Representative (representing common, commercial interests). But the twist, points to the fact that not all so-called "class conflicts" are the same. Some are horizontal; others are vertical. Economically speaking, the Civil War was a conflict between big landowners (in the South) versus big merchants (in the North). In the United States, the upper house itself became the battle ground between the competing interests of two opposed upper classes.

The other side of the coin was that, unlike 17th to 19th century England, the American lower house did represent the "lower classes". The North-South conflict that played itself out in the Senate was unique in the sense that it was a constitutional conflict over the bedrock issue of what kind of economy would rule the country. Once the rival upper classes had duked it out, the business at hand returned to the more traditional vertical class conflict. Thus, beginning in 1865 political issues and economic rivalries are increasingly characterized by a conflict between labour and capital, the freeholder and the railroads. In other words, in the United States, senatorial "Lords" and representative "Commons" did represent a vertical class conflict between the big and little guy.

With respect to this vertical conflict, the "upper house" of Congress was designed not to push a case, so much as to block, cut off, or stifle someone else’s case. Not only did "weighted" representation give Big Guys in Small States an advantage over small guys in big states, the Senate's rules -- particularly the filibuster -- gave the big guys the right to shut down business altogether. It was as if one boxer had the right to simply ring the round to a close whenever he chose. Bong! You loose. Next.

To make matters worse, by providing for staggered elections, the Constitution intentionally rendered the Senate "immune" (i.e. unresponsive to) any popular demand for change even assuming this demand were so overwhelming that it swamped every one of the state legislatures. Such a tremendous social and political upheaval, tantamount to a revolution, could not work a change in more than 1/3 the Senate.

Old Senate Chamber

This grotestque perversion of democracy has been gussied up in the manra of ‘protecting “minority rights". But the mantra is false.

In democracies, all pe0ple have rights equally and this universal application of rights ends up protecting the rights of both the majority and the minority. It does so simply because the rights apply to all, regardless of present political power or status.

Minority interests are a different matter. There is no democratic reason why minority interests should prevail over those of majority. To allows as much is not competition, but a veto power as absolute and aribitrary as that of any Louis XIV or Stalin.

Why should such a power exist in a democracy? It should not. The U.S. Constitution accords a limited veto power to the Court and to the Chief Executive. There is no reason to have an additional veto of one house over another, and by a minority in the Senate over the will of all. It is a complete absurdity

The definition of a democracy is one in which the sovereign legislative authority is vested in an elected body whose acts and decisions are determined by numerical majority. To allow a minority to over-rule the majority - and in the case of a filibuster to entirely estop even a vote -- is a contradiction in terms.

It may be argued that the U.S. Senate and its procedural rules simply provide for a “heightened” majoritarian threshold... of 60, 75 or 80 percent as apposed to 51. Theoretically that is true. But as a practical matter heighted majorities are untenable.

It is quite feasible to provide for higher majoritarian thresholds in primitive societies, precisely because they are primitive and uniformity of interests and opinions is both common and likely. But as society becomes vaster and more complex, interests multiply and become increasingly irreconcileable, so that even simple majorities are often hard to obtain. To require heightened majorities is to insure that large countries which are most in need of active governance cannot be governed at all. This is a prescription for anarchy; and where powerful corporations are at large, a prescription for corporate anarchy.

In a sense, this is precisely the dilemma of all empires; namely, that as they grow they become increasingly more difficult to govern by any democratic or republican means and this ends up requiring rule by executive decree. This is what happened to the Roman Republic turned Empire.

The United States sought to solve this dilemma by providing for rule by the “Alphabet Soup” executive agencies as directed and supervised by Congress. In other words, Congress would delegate vast quantities of actual decision making power to the bureaucracy while retaining general oversight and control.

The system of having Congress decide the direction and contours of policy while leaving effective implementation to subsidiary bureaucracies, has worked passably well, particularly if one ignores the busy elf-work of bureaucratics lobbyists. But it cannot work at all if Congress cannot come to a decision at all and if any decision it might come to can be hijacked by a few men or even by one.

The U.S. Senate all but insures rule by minority and this is an anti-democratic absurdity which has over and over again brought mischief on the country. It led to the Civil War, the colossal anti-farmer, anti-progressive, anti-labor corruption of the Guilded Age, to the emasculation of the League of Nations, and almost to the strangulation of the Civil Rights Movement.

One almost every issue of significance the Senate has been on the wrong side of Justice and History; and, where not, it has only been because some political giant like FDR or LBJ was strong enough to stampede it or squeeze it into compliance (...and LBJ knew how to squeeze).

James Madison, chief architect of the Constitution was rightly concerned with problems of faction and perils presented by “pure democracy”. There is no question but that absolute majority rule can be manipulated, stirred up and itself become repressive. Pure democracies, he writes,

“... have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. “

Although Madison was speaking of direct democracies, the observation holds true even for representative democracies acting solely on the basis of majoritarian rule. It was precisely for such reasons that executive and judicial vetoes serve legitimate functions in braking what might be called “run away democracy”.

Notwithstanding his democratic caution, Madison himself was opposed to a bicameral congress and was opposed to the creeation of a Senate.

The Senate by its inherent nature distorts and stunts the functioning of democracy. It exists solely to thwart and repress the will of the people. That it may not do so when it is 80% controlled by a single, unified party is irrelvant since such circusmtances of near unanimty are rare. The divide in a democracy is always much closer to the 50-60 percent mark and that is precisely where the present Senate consistently exists to thwart any legislation at all.

It is no doubt true that an English parliamentary system would be far superior to the freakish presidential system established under the U.S. Constitution. But, as it is said, You can’t teach an old dog new tricks. We are stuck with a constitution that we at least think “has worked” for 200 hundred years. But as the health care fiasco has proved beyond a shadow of a doubt, the Congress no longer does tricks at all.

If there is any hope for democracy left in the U.S. the Senate needs to be abolished. Forthwith.

Bring back the People’s Witan.

Elizabeth II & Parliament

©WCG, 2010